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Abstract 
We present results from quantitative exercises using the Lucas and Romer endogenous growth models, from which we 
calculate welfare losses from the distortions presented in the Romer model. Moreover, comparing the models to data, 
we show that an economy governed by the Romer model would attain a higher welfare than one governed by the 
Lucas model, contrary to what can be interpreted from some previous theoretical contributions.
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     1 Introduction
Nearly twenty years ago Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990) made two of the main seminal
contributions that established endogenous growth theory. As usual, some of the following
articles studied the properties of the steady-state and convergence of both models.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Faig (1995) made a dynamic analysis that intend
to show that the Lucas model steady-state is saddle-path stable. Asada, Semmler, and
Novak (1998) have shown that locally the steady-state of the optimal growth path is a
saddle-point. The market equilibrium of the Lucas model is also analysed by Benhabib
and Perli (1994), showing that indeterminacy can arise under very plausible parameters.
Benhabib, Perli, and Xie (1994) show that in the Romer model, indeterminacies can
arise under complementarity in the intermediate inputs. Arnold (2000a) shows that the
steady-state is locally saddle-path stable. Additionally, Arnold (2000b) demonstrates
that for any initial endowments of capital and knowledge, an unique path converging to
the steady-state exists. This result is valid globally as the author exploits a notational
adjustment that converts the analysis done to study the Lucas’ model, also applicable to
the Romer’s model. This article also showed that an optimal subsidy scheme implies that
the decentralized equilibrium of the Romer model is equivalent to the optimal equilibrium.
In this paper, we pursue two goals. First, we derive the welfare losses for the market
economy of the Romer model relative to the optimal growth framework of the Lucas
model. This is useful to determine how much the economy losses when it stands without
the optimal subsidy scheme described in Arnold (2000b). Second, we argue that when
we compare the models to data, a decentralized Romer economy is better than a Lucas
economy in terms of welfare, contrary to what may be interpreted by the analysis of the
Arnold (2000b) article. We present these results taking the transition paths into account.
The next section makes a brief presentation of the models, describing the growth
problem for both. Section 3 presents and compares the convergence trajectories of both
models, calculates welfare and welfare losses, and discusses the adherence to reality. The
fourth section concludes.
2 The Model
This section recapitulates the Arnold (2000b) comparison between the Lucas (1988) and
the Romer (1990) models of endogenous growth.
2.1 Setup of the Models
The optimal-growth problem for an economy with human capital accumulation as in the













1¡® ¡ C (1)
¢
H = B(1 ¡ u)H
where C is consumption, K is physical capital, H is human capital, u is the share of human
capital employed in the ﬁnal good production (Y = K®(uH)1¡®); B is the productivity
in the human capital sector, ½ is the intertemporal discount factor, and ¾ governs the
elasticity of substitution.
The transitional dynamics of the problem is described by a system of three diﬀerential
equations, derived by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Faig (1995), and also presented in
Arnold (2000b), as follows:




















¡ Â ¡ B (1 ¡ u) (4)
where gy is the growth rate of a given variable y, z = (uH=K)
1¡® and Â = C=K:













1¡® ¡ C (5)
¢
A = ±A(L ¡ LY)
where A is technology, L is labor and LY is labor allocated to the ﬁnal good sector. If
u = LY=L; H = AL and B = ±L, the problem described by (5) would be converted on
the problem described by (1).
The decentralized equilibrium is described in Arnold (2000b:223-224) as well as the
diﬀerential equations that describe the transition to the steady-state. Without consider-
ing any subsidy scheme in the decentralized equilibrium, the transition is described by a
system of three diﬀerential equations as follows:
gz = (1 ¡ ®)(Bu ¡ ®z) (6)










gu = (Bu ¡ ®z) + z ¡ Â ¡ B (1 ¡ u) (8)
2In the following section, we calculate the growth path of the Lucas economy, inte-
grating equations (2) to (4) and of the Romer economy, integrating equations (6) to (8).
We perform this exercise using backward integration as in Brunner and Strulik (2002).
We begin arbitrarily close to the steady-state and we backward integrate equations that
describe the evolution of z, Â, and u. The integration proceeds until the allocation of
resources to the ﬁnal good u reaches 1.
3 Convergence and Welfare
Arnold (2000b) showed that the optimal path of the Romer model could be analysed
through the optimal path of the Lucas model, through mere notational re-arrangements.
Thus we simulate the transition path of both models and compare their behaviour. We
consider the following values for parameters: ® = 0:36; ¾ = 2; ½ = 0:02;B = 0:15: These
values are quite standard in the literature. However, parameter B may deserve further
discussion, which we do in the following subsection.
Considering the same parameter values in both models is crucial for the comparison.
This implies a higher growth rate in the optimal Lucas problem (6.50%) than in the
decentralized equilibrium of the Romer model (1.44%). The evolution of the output
growth rate (gY) and of the share of human capital allocated to knowledge production
(human capital in the Lucas model and ideas in the Romer model) - uY - are presented
below:






















Figure 1: Transition Paths in the Lucas Economy






























































3The main diﬀerence to note from the ﬁgures is that the growth rate is increasing in
the Lucas model and decreasing in the Romer model. This happens because, due to the
markup, the Romer economy allocates less resources to R&D than the Lucas economy
to the human capital accumulation. Initially, the share of resources allocated to the
growth-source activity increases slowly in the Romer economy, which, together with the
decreasing growth rate of physical capital, implies a decreasing output growth rate. The
opposite occurs in the Lucas economy. This economy sharply re-allocates resources from
the ﬁnal good into the human capital accumulation sector, which implies an increasing
output growth rate. As it is evident from the ﬁgures, the Lucas economy has a higher
growth rate and a lower share of human capital in the ﬁnal good production than the
Romer economy. These results will have signiﬁcant impact in terms of welfare as will be
shown below.











where Utr is the utility level calculated through the transition and is calculated using the
trapezoid rule. It represents the welfare attained until the last period of the transition
path. The second term of the right hand side calculates utility after the economy attains
the steady-state, where Css is the level of consumption at the steady-state. We note that
as utility is a discounted value, it is independent of the number of years of transition.
Thus, we stress that utility is directly calculated from its equation, taking the transition
path into account. As a normalization, we set C(0) = 1. The welfare in the Lucas
economy is 81.233 and the welfare in the Romer decentralized equibrium is 72.727. The
welfare gained throughout transition is U tr = 31:239 in the Lucas economy against
U tr = 22:794 in the Romer economy. The optimal subsidy scheme presented by Arnold
(2000b), if implemented from the beginning, will achieve a welfare gain of 8.506.
3.1 Taking the Models to Data
The interpretation of the Lucas model as the optimal problem of the Romer decentralized
equilibrium, due to Arnold (2000b), may indicate that the welfare attained by means of
a human capital accumulation economy must be higher than the welfare attained by the
innovating economy described by Romer (1990). However, this is an idea that we want to
confront. When we take both models to data, there are crucial diﬀerences between their
reasonable parameters and thus, between their predictions towards welfare. A simple
exercise is to consider a (World) economy with a reasonable growth rate of 2% (see e.g.
Maddison, 2001) and derive the implications of both models in terms of welfare. The




implies BLucas = 0:06, and uss L




which implies BRomer = 0:186666, and uss R
Y = 0:893: These values are realistic as the
corresponding share of resources allocated to learning is higher that the share allocated
to R&D, as it is in reality. When calculating welfare we now see that an innovating
economy always implies a higher welfare than a human capital economy. This happens
because the Romer economy allocated more resources to the ﬁnal good that is provided for
4consumption. This implies a higher rate of growth of consumption throughout transitional
dynamics in the Romer economy than in the Lucas economy, eventhough the steady-state
growth rate is equal between both economies. This result is in fact obtained through the
analysis of transitional dynamics, which is crucial for the analysis of welfare. Figure 3
and 4 show the evolution of the growth rate of consumption in both economies.









Figure 3: Growth Rate of Consumption in the Lucas Economy - Matching with data













































































Table 1 shows welfare for diﬀerent output growth rates, comparing the results of a
human capital economy (Lucas) and an innovating economy (Romer) (when both imply
the same output growth rate). The table shows that for reasonable values for the growth
rate of the economy, it is always true that the innovative economy provides higher welfare
than the human capital economy.
Table 1 - Welfare in Lucas and in Romer Model
gY 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5%
Lucas Economy 55.22 63.60 68.51 71.99 74.58
Romer Economy 59.89 68.23 73.23 76.75 79.36
54 Conclusion
In this article, we depart from the comparison between the well-know endogenous growth
models of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990) provided by Arnold (2000b) to present quan-
titative welfare results from those models. Arnold (2000b) showed that with a simple
rearrangement of parameter deﬁnition, the Romer optimal problem is similar to the Lu-
cas optimal problem. Additionally, he showed that a subsidy scheme can internalize all
the market distortions in the Romer model.
As the interpretation of the Lucas model as the optimal solution of the Romer de-
centralized equilibrium can lead to the conclusion that a human capital driven economy
leads to a higher well-being than an ideas driven economy, we clarify this issue. In fact,
when taking both models to data, for an economy with the same economic growth rate,
an innovating Romer economy leaves economic agents always better-oﬀ than an human
capital driven economy as in Lucas (1988).
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